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Abstract 
While economic literature inspired by the “tragedy of the commons” has emphasised people’s 
tendency to increase fishing effort beyond desirable levels, sociologists and anthropologists 
who have studied the social aspects of fishing have often emphasised the capacity of these 
factors to restrict fishing effort. The article addresses the influence of social norms and 
communication on fishing effort in an empirical study of the Atlantic blue whiting fishery. 
The data were generated at a time when this fishery had yet to see effective quota regulations, 
and had been subject to a rapid growth in fishing effort, making it the largest fishery in the 
Atlantic. The article argues that social norms and communication patterns in the fishing fleet 
create a synergic effect of co-operation and competition on fishing effort. The article 
questions the view that social norms and communication necessarily represent a solution to 
the tragedy of the commons. 
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Introduction 
While economic literature inspired by the “tragedy of the commons” (Gordon 1954; 
Hardin 1968) has emphasised people’s tendency to increase fishing effort beyond desirable 
levels, sociologists and anthropologists critical of the model of agency underlying economic 
theory have often emphasised the capacity of social norms and communication to restrict 
fishing effort (Acheson 1975; Berkes 1987; Matthews 1993; Maurstad 2000). This article 
aims to present an alternative view based on an empirical study of the effects of social norms 
on fishing effort in Norway’s blue whiting fisheries. The article shares the widespread 
scepticism of the simplistic model of agency implicit in the “tragedy of the commons” 
(McCay and Acheson 1987), but questions the view that people’s normative and 
communicative capabilities necessarily represent a solution to the problem of unsustainable 
resource harvesting. The basic features of the study are illustrated in simplified form in Figure 
1. The paper addresses the influence of social norms on competition and co-operation 
amongst fishermen. Subsequently, it focuses on the effects of such normatively-based 
competition and co-operative communication on learning and innovation, which are major 
generators of fishing capacity. It also addresses the influence of co-operation on the 
organisation of vessels on the fishing grounds, which is important for the efficiency of the 
fleet. Finally, it assesses the effects of competition on fishermen’s utilisation of fishing 
capacity. 
 
Fig. 1. The research problem 
 
This paper forms part of an academic discourse with significant policy relevance. 
Technological development, expansion of the world’s fishing fleets and subsequent 
overfishing of many wild fish stocks have made the question of fishing effort the most 
pressing and difficult issue for fisheries managers to deal with, and the social aspects of 
fishing effort have been relatively neglected in this area.  
Social norms 
Competition 
Co-operation  
Fishing effort 
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The above outline implies that fishing capacity and capacity utilisation are considered 
core aspects of fishing effort. These concepts need to be understood in the following analysis. 
 
“[Fishing capacity] is the amount of fish (or fishing effort) that can be produced 
over a period of time (e.g. a year or a fishing season) by a vessel or a fleet if fully 
utilized and for a given resource condition (FAO 2004: 119). 
 
Fishing capacity is usually estimated on the basis of data on quantities and types of 
vessels and fishing gear. However, the extent to which a fisherman is able to turn his material 
assets into fish catch depends on his knowledge of how, when and where to use them most 
efficiently. Fishermen’s knowledge and learning are thus natural topics in a study of fishing 
capacity. This paper addresses the influence of norms and communication on knowledge. It is 
difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the importance of knowledge in fishing, but statistical 
evidence from the Icelandic herring fisheries shows that catches vary systematically between 
skippers when boat size and time spent fishing are controlled for, which supports the 
hypothesis that differences in fishing capacity can to a significant extent be accounted for by 
differences in knowledge (Thorlindson 1988). The FAO working group on fishing capacity 
(2000) indeed also recognised that the long-term desired level for estimation of fishing 
capacity would include data on fishermen’s skills. 
Fishing capacity only affects fish stocks to the extent that it is actually utilised. In 
fisheries management, the concept of fishing capacity is consequently supplemented with the 
notion of “capacity utilisation”, which is defined as follows: 
 
“Capacity utilization [is the] degree to which the vessel is utilized. From an input-
based perspective, capacity utilization may be expressed as the ratio of the number 
of days actually fished to the number of days the boat could potentially fish under 
normal working conditions. From an output-based perspective, capacity utilization 
is the ratio of the actual catch to the potential catch (if fully utilized)” (FAO 2004: 
119). 
 
According to these definitions, catch and fishing effort emerge as the products of fishing 
capacity and capacity utilisation. Fishing effort can consequently be managed by controlling 
either fishing capacity, capacity utilisation or both. 
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Methodological Approach 
The main data were generated through fieldwork on board four combined purse 
seine/pelagic trawl vessels licensed for blue whiting fisheries. These vessels belong to the 
same fishing community and are part of a leading milieu in Norway’s blue whiting fisheries. 
The article thus presents a single-case study of a collectivity of fishermen and the shared 
norms and practices that affect their fishing effort. I spent 5-12 days on each vessel during the 
2003 and 2004 seasons, covering their main fisheries: blue whiting, herring and mackerel. A 
total of 24 fieldwork days were spent specifically in the blue whiting fisheries. 
The data were generated through a combination of observation and interviews. To the 
extent possible, the interviews were directly related to current observations. A typical 
approach would be to observe a specific incident or operation while asking for explanations, 
interpretations or comments on what was going on and how things were done. I spent most of 
my time on the bridge, which is the centre of communication, decision-making and work co-
ordination onboard. The skipper and the trawl boss (or mate) – the two decision-makers on 
the vessels – always constituted the main informants, but data were also generated through 
interaction with other crew members. Data on organisation of fishing grounds were 
supplemented with illustrations of fleet movement patterns drawn from the map machine and 
radar screens. I generated additional data on shorter fieldwork trips to the community, and 
through interviews with owners and company administrations. 
I attended the summer fisheries in the Norwegian Sea. The relatively low density of blue 
whiting in this area resulted in long periods – often around 20 hours – of non-stop trawling. 
The fishermen’s activities on the bridge were thus dominated by observation of and 
interaction with other vessels in search of information on the whereabouts of fish, observation 
of the sonar screens and sounders for the same purpose, and long hours of waiting. This 
provided good opportunities for in-depth conversation with skippers and trawl bosses/mates, 
as well as observation of communication practices.  
Data were recorded during observations and interviews, and written out during regular 
withdrawals to my personal cabin. I systematised the various topics in an index, allowing 
comparison of data on specific issues across situations, informants and vessels. For presenting 
large amounts of qualitative data in the compact form required by the article format, I 
gathered and compared the specific observations and abstracted them into descriptions of 
typical patterns. Deviations in the data are addressed in footnotes. Generally, the data are clear 
and consistent, and anomalies are not a significant problem. I have supplemented the general 
descriptions with a few examples drawn directly from field notes. These examples are only 
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illustrations, not complete presentations of data. Throughout the paper, I have added 
information on the data that underlie the generalised descriptions. 
The Literature on the Social Aspects of Fishing Effort 
The literature on the social aspects of fishing effort can be divided into two main bodies. 
First are studies of learning through information sharing. There is a significant amount of 
literature on information management in fisheries, but many contributions are now quite 
dated, and ethnographic descriptions from modern, and especially capital-intensive, fisheries 
are scarce. Andersen’s (1972) work on Newfoundland trawler fishermen, which remains one 
of the most thorough empirical descriptions of information management in offshore fisheries, 
describes how the captain’s authority on board and ability to attract skilled crew members 
depends on his reputation in terms of fish catching skills. This reputation is based on success 
relative to other vessels rather than absolute figures, which makes it rational for the individual 
skippers to systematically lie and conceal information about their fishing. Andersen argues 
that this individual rationality leads to inefficient fishing, as mutual practices of information 
sharing would have increased the fishing capacity of the fleet as a whole.  
Orbach's (1977) study of Californian off-shore tuna seiners describes a system of limited 
information sharing in formalised networks that communicate internally through a set of 
secret codes and enforce social norms against sharing information with outsiders. Like 
Andersen, Orbach argues that this system leads to economic inefficiency in the fleet as a 
whole, compared with a system of more complete information transfer. Gatewood’s (1984) 
study of the competitive Alaskan salmon fisheries is another one that emphasises the limited 
nature of co-operative practices, which are usually restricted to temporary formal 
arrangements within small cliques of friends and relatives, and the wide-spread use of secrecy 
and deception. Stuster (1978) has applied a similar perspective to information-sharing cliques 
in the Californian salmon fisheries (see also Orth 1987; Pollnac and Carmo 1980). Several 
more brief presentations of information management in fisheries have also emphasised 
secrecy (Acheson 1988: 102-103; Forman 1967; Peace 1996), although it has been argued that 
social integration among fishermen tends to reduce the element of secrecy and deceit (Palmer 
1990). A series of interviews with Icelandic fishing skippers showed that secrecy and lies 
were used extensively in terms of catch information, while fishermen shared their knowledge 
on fishing technology (Thorlindson 1994). Social science studies of information management 
in fishing thus largely emphasise the restrictive effects of competition on fishing capacity. 
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The second body of literature on the social aspects of fishing effort consists of studies 
related to the discourse on the tragedy of the commons. Economic theory predicts that fishers 
increase their fishing effort up to a point where a further increase no longer appears to the 
individual as profitable. This thesis has given rise to the idea that individually-rational choices 
amount to the aggregate effect of depleting the common pool resource, leading to a sub-
optimal outcome for all, unless fishing effort is restricted by the state (Gordon 1954; Hardin 
1968). Anthropologists and sociologists have often emphasised the misplaced and potentially 
detrimental nature of state interference in communities’ utilisation of common pool resources. 
The main argument is that people possess normative and communicative capacities that are 
overlooked by economic models, and that these capacities often restrict harvesting efforts, 
keeping them at sustainable levels (Maurstad 2000; McCay & Acheson 1987; Pinkerton 
1987). An early, and now classic, example is a study of lobster fisheries in Maine where an 
informal system of sea tenure kept the fishing effort at a long-term profitable level in the 
absence of state interference (Acheson 1975). Numerous case studies conducted later have 
shown that people are capable of building and enforcing informal institutions that restrict 
fishing effort, for instance through informal systems of sea tenure (Matthews & Phyne 1988; 
Matthews 1993), traditional fishing practice customs (Berkes 1987), informally-enforced 
conservation ethics (Stoffle et al. 1994), and religious beliefs (Anderson 1994). Maurstad 
(2000) argues that social control mechanisms restricted capacity utilisation directly among 
Norwegian inshore fishermen before government restrictions became a major factor in 
fishing, impeding the tragedy of the commons. 
In sum, studies on the social aspects of fishing have usually emphasised factors that 
restrict fishing effort. This literature may thus leave the somewhat paradoxical impression that 
fishers are capable of co-operating for the purpose of conservation, while they are less so for 
the purpose of efficient fishing. This article argues that normative and communicative factors 
have contributed significantly to the rapidly increased fishing effort in Norway’s blue whiting 
fisheries, and that they reinforce the development towards overfishing that is predicted by the 
tragedy of the commons model, increasing the need for external regulation. 
The Development of Fishing Effort in the Blue Whiting Fisheries 
Blue whiting is a pelagic gadoid (a species belonging to the cod family) that can be found 
in most areas of the Northeast Atlantic. The highest concentrations can be found at depths of 
300 - 600 m off the edge of the continental shelf. It is assumed that the stock consists of 
several components that are partly mixed on the spawning grounds. However, in terms of 
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scientific advice and management, the blue whiting of the Northeast Atlantic is treated as one 
single stock. Blue whiting matures at the age of 2 – 4 years, and then migrates to waters west 
of the British Isles each spring to spawn. The main catches of blue whiting are made in this 
area during the spawning season, but blue whiting has also been fished in the Norwegian Sea 
and the North Sea in recent years (ICES 2004a; ICES 2004b; Heino 2004; Skogen et al. 
1999). 
The blue whiting fisheries of the Northeast Atlantic began in the early 1970s, with Spain, 
the Soviet Union, the Faeroe Islands and Norway as the pioneer nations. Norway and the 
Soviet Union expanded their blue whiting fisheries throughout the 1970s. Soviet catches 
decreased and levelled off in the early 1980s, while Norway continued to increase its fishing 
and has been the leading blue whiting fisheries state since then.  
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Fig. 2. Blue whiting catches in the Northeast Atlantic1 
 
Figure 2 shows that catches increased dramatically from 1998 onwards, as fishermen 
became aware of large fishable concentrations of blue whiting in international waters. The 
traditional blue whiting fishing states – Norway, Russia and the Faeroe Islands – increased 
their efforts greatly, and Iceland also entered the fishery and quickly became one of the main 
blue whiting harvesting states. The fisheries also expanded into areas where there was 
formerly little fishing for this species, such as the North Sea (in sub-area IVa, Fig. 3) and, 
especially, the Norwegian Sea (in sub-area IIa). This resulted in extraction of more immature 
                                                 
 
1 Source: ICES catch statistics database. 
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fish.2 Catches of blue whiting in the Northeast Atlantic reached 2.3 million tonnes in 2003, 
which made it the largest fishery in the Atlantic in terms of quantities landed (Heino 2004). 
 
 
Fig. 3. Map of ICES fishing areas3. 
                                                 
 
2 Sources: ICES catch statistics database; ICES 2004a. 
3 Source: ICES. 
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Norway’s blue whiting fishery has mainly been a directed pelagic trawl fishery 
performed with combined purse seiners / trawlers. The season starts in the spawning areas in 
January/February and ends in the Norwegian Sea in mid summer. However, these vessels also 
participate in several other fisheries during this period, such as purse seine fishing for 
mackerel and herring. In addition, industrial trawlers, which are a separate fleet segment, 
perform a mixed fishery for blue whiting and Norway pout (ICES 2004a). Figure 4 shows that 
the spawning grounds west of the British Isles (sub-areas VIa + b and VIIb + c) have 
constituted the main fishing area for Norwegian vessels, while the feeding areas in sub-area 
IIa of the Norwegian Sea have gained importance in recent years. The Norwegian fleet lands 
almost all of its blue whiting for fish meal and oil production, making it a low-value species. 
Profits consequently depend on a combination of good catch rates and great volumes. 
Norwegian blue whiting catches were 851,000 tonnes in 2003, and increased further to a 
record high of 958,000 tonnes in 20044.  
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Fig. 4. Norway’s blue whiting catches, by ICES fishing area and year5. 
 
Scientific advice suggests that the current high catch levels are based on the 
exceptionally high recruitment of blue whiting in recent years, and that the current fishing 
effort will not be sustainable when recruitment returns to normal levels (ICES 2004b). 
                                                 
 
4 Source: Directorate of Fisheries. 
5 Source: ICES. 
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The Regulatory Regime 
The data for this study were generated at a time when the harvesting of the blue whiting 
stock had never been effectively restricted by quota regulations. Blue whiting is a straddling 
and highly migratory fish stock – fished in international waters and the Exclusive Economic 
Zones (EEZs) of the EU, Norway, Iceland and the Faeroe Islands. The coastal states had not 
managed to agree on a quota regime when I conducted the fieldwork in 2003 and 2004. The 
need for a multi-lateral quota agreement was recognised when catches began to increase in 
1998. The coastal states, plus Greenland and Russia, started negotiating in 1999 for the 
purpose of establishing a management regime, agreeing to combine management by the 
coastal states with a NEAFC6 regime for the fisheries in international waters. NEAFC 
subsequently suggested a quota but the coastal states were unable to agree on a principle of 
distribution. Consequently, the NEAFC initiative was put on hold from 2002 (ICES 2004a; 
Government of Norway 2004). This dispute led the states into a resource-depleting “chicken 
game”, where they increased or removed unilateral quotas in order to force their counterparts’ 
willingness to compromise. The fieldwork was conducted while this conflict was at its peak. 
Norway has exchanged fishing rights with other coastal states in the Northeast Atlantic 
for many years, and has thus acquired annual quotas for blue whiting in the EEZs of the EU 
and the Faeroe Islands. Norway also started setting blue whiting quotas for Norwegian purse 
seiners / trawlers in waters under Norwegian jurisdiction and on the high seas in 1999. These 
arrangements amounted to annual quotas of some 500,000 tonnes for Norwegian vessels 
during the following years. However, as the international allocation conflict intensified, 
Norway ceased to implement its quotas. In 2003, the Ministry of Fisheries did not stop the 
fishery until Norwegian vessels had taken almost twice their quota. In 2004 the Ministry 
granted Norwegian vessels a free fishery for blue whiting in Norwegian waters and on the 
high seas.7 The fieldwork was carried out at a time when Norway’s blue whiting fisheries 
represented a case of rapidly increased fishing effort in the absence of efficient quota 
regulations. 
The negotiating states finally managed to reach an agreement on allocation principles in 
December 2005, after I had completed the fieldwork. The total allowable catch (TAC)8 for 
2006 was set to 2 million tonnes, which is approximately equal to the catches of 2005. The 
                                                 
 
6 NEAFC (Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission) is an international organisation of coastal states in the 
Northeast Atlantic, established for the purpose of managing fisheries in international waters. 
7 Sources: Government of Norway 1999; 1996; Quota statistics from the Directorate of Fisheries. 
8 TAC is the total amount allowed to be harvested from a certain fish stock. 
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scientific recommendation was a TAC of 1.5 million tonnes. The current regime does not 
imply great reductions in fishing compared to recent years’ catches, but the negotiating states 
are aiming to reduce the TACs gradually in the years to come (Government of Norway 2006). 
Norwegian authorities regulate entrance to the fishery through licensing. Approximately 
40 combined purse seiners / trawlers took part in the blue whiting fisheries in the late 1990s, 
while 46 participated in 2003 (ICES 2004a; Government of Norway 1999). The increased 
catches thus mainly stem from increased fishing effort by a stable group of participants rather 
than from a large number of new entrants.  
The Norwegian purse seiner / trawler fleet is regulated by TACs and vessel quotas in all 
major fisheries, until recently except from blue whiting. The fishing capacity of these vessels 
is much greater than their quotas in other fisheries today. Putting surplus effort into the 
scarcely regulated blue whiting fisheries has thus emerged as a rational adaptation. This is 
particularly the case, as there has been high catchability and high recruitment to this stock in 
recent years. The catch per unit of effort  – which indicates the abundance of fish as well as 
fishing technology and knowledge  – increased from approximately 45 tonnes per hour in 
1998 to about 55 tonnes per hour in 2003 (ICES 2004a: 213). 
Normative and Communicative Aspects of Fishing Effort in the Blue Whiting Fleet of 
Seaborn Hills 
The Setting 
Seaborn Hills9 has more than 20 offshore purse seiners / trawlers that are licensed for 
blue whiting fisheries, making it a leading community in this fishery. This community, which 
is located on the west coast of Norway, has no more than 4,500 inhabitants and is largely built 
on the fisheries. It has nearly 300 registered fishermen, and almost half its work force is 
employed in fishing-related activities. The vessels are mostly owned by local families and are 
also manned locally. They are operated by crews of 8-10 people, including the skipper, 
net/trawl boss, mate or bosun, chief with two assistants, steward and a couple of fishermen. 
They are all employed on a share basis. Formally, the skipper is the head of the vessel, while 
the net boss leads the fish searching and fish catching operations. However, in practice the 
skipper and the trawl boss usually make decisions by consensus. It is quite common for 
owners to sail as either net/trawl boss or skipper, and the administrative tasks on shore are 
often carried out by owners who have retired from active fishing. Some companies have 
                                                 
 
9 I have given the fishermen’s home community a fictional name, as this study also addressed fisheries crime and 
compliance. 
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replaced the traditional boss with a mate, leaving more of the fishing responsibilities to the 
skipper. However, this change usually has modest practical implications. Kinship and 
community permeates the crew and company structure, and the fisheries are intimately 
connected with the general social life of Seaborn Hills. Many families have relatives in 
fishing, and fishing news is exchanged and discussed wherever people meet. The professional 
reputations of owners, skippers and trawl bosses greatly affect their individual standings in 
the community. 
Two types of social norms are crucial in terms of reputation. First are the social norms of 
excellence that underlie the prestige of a company, skipper and trawl boss. These norms are 
related to their success in fishing compared to others. During the summer fisheries in the 
Norwegian Sea, most vessels heaved their trawls more or less simultaneously every midnight 
when the fishery was at its poorest. During these hours there was intense radio activity 
regarding the performances of the various vessels, and skippers and trawl bosses evaluated 
their fishing by comparing themselves to other boats. It is common for skippers to be in daily 
contact with the company administration ashore, and crew members keep in contact with their 
families over the vessels’ satellite phones. Consequently, information on the relative 
performances of the vessels spreads quickly in the community ashore. I witnessed the same 
phenomenon in seine fisheries. These observations were followed up by conversations with 
the skippers and trawl bosses regarding the importance of relative performance. The interview 
data were clear and consistent across vessels, fisheries and companies. The fishermen 
described performance relative to other vessels as a major motivating force. Performance was 
primarily measured in relative catch quantity, which was compared each day, after each trip, 
and in particular each year. The local newspaper prints reports of the past days’ catches, and 
the annual ranking of the 2003 blue whiting fishery was published nationwide in the fisheries 
press. The vessels placements in the various rankings are a matter of genuine concern among 
fishermen. Relative catch is socially significant as evidence of the skill, persistence and 
cleverness of the skipper and the trawl boss, and the fishermen are clear that competition for 
catch is competition for prestige. There is significant social status associated with being a top-
ranking boat in Seaborn Hills. In the largely unregulated blue whiting fisheries of 2003 and 
2004, this competition was undisturbed by quota regulations. 
Catch quantity is one among several indicators of professional skill relevant to social 
prestige. For example, there is social recognition associated with achieving high prices at the 
fish auctions, which indicates quality and clever timing, and by being ahead in terms of 
technical gear and expertise. Signs of professional skill are a topic of constant concern and 
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discussion among fishermen, and the relative success of a vessel is openly acknowledged 
among competitors. On two different vessels, I observed the leading personnel lauding major 
competitors for performing better on specific occasions than they did themselves. 
Competition for prestige is the main non-economic factor explaining the level of fishing 
effort in the blue whiting fleet of Seaborn Hills. The interview data on all vessels confirm the 
importance of competition as a motivating force, and the fishermen always evaluated their 
performance in relative terms. The following comment, made by a net/trawl boss after a day 
of poor fishing, is illustrative: “If we had been the only ones [failing], it would have been a 
catastrophe.” It is hardly possible, and may not even be meaningful, to quantify the relative 
importance of this factor compared to economic considerations, but skippers and trawl bosses 
describe this competition as a major source of motivation in terms of fishing effort, as stated 
by this skipper: “It’s the competition that’s driving us. We’re less concerned with how much 
we earn than we are with getting more than the others.” These vessels have constituted the 
most profitable part of the Norwegian fishing fleet in recent years. A regular crew member 
earns approximately twice the Norwegian average salary, while skippers and net bosses earn 
twice that of the regular crew member, and the companies currently are not under economic 
pressure. The absence of economic pressure arguably increases the perceived importance of 
the social reward for successful fishing. 
Competition is multi-levelled. The descriptions of the competitive climate given by 
skippers and trawl bosses emphasised the competition against close relations, such as vessels 
from the same harbour or municipality, for the largest catch. Three of the four vessels had one 
specific boat that was considered their main competitor. These pairs of competitors shared the 
same harbours and had kinship ties at skipper/trawl boss level. As we will return to, their 
main competitors were also their main co-operative partners in fishing, meaning that the 
intensity of competition as well as co-operation increased as the social ties got stronger.10 
Such main competitors/collaborators are generally referred to as “mates” among fishermen. 
The fishermen also described competition against all other vessels in the national ranking. 
The competition among individual vessels is by far the dominating feature in these data, but 
the fishermen informed me that there is also an element of joint competition, where vessels 
from the same community, i.e. harbour or municipality, compare themselves with fishermen 
from elsewhere. The Norwegian purse seine/trawler fleet is mainly concentrated in two 
                                                 
 
10 Like the other vessels, the fourth boat also had a network of close relations based on kin and company with 
whom it closely co-operated. However, the skipper and crew never pointed out any specific main competitor 
amongst these. 
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municipalities, one of which is Seaborn Hills, and there is a certain degree of rivalry between 
the two. 
In order for relative success to generate prestige, it must be achieved in compliance with 
the second type of social norms, that is, the moral rules of acceptable behaviour. Several 
behavioural norms are relevant in this respect, but three are especially significant in terms of 
fishing capacity. First is the norm against lying. The interview data from all four vessels were 
clear and consistent in terms of the moral distinctions of truthfulness in this fleet. It is 
commonly accepted to not tell the whole truth, but a fisherman quickly loses his good 
reputation if he is caught telling a downright lie. The fishermen informed me that, generally, 
there is a high degree of compliance with this norm. They have seldom experienced being lied 
to during their careers. This was supported by the observational data. I never witnessed a 
fisherman on any of the boats I travelled with giving false information to another vessel. This 
is notable, as information on catch, fish findings and gear is exchanged more or less 
continuously.  
Second is the norm of reciprocity, which ensures that favours are received with a tacit 
obligation to reciprocate on a later occasion. This norm was emphasised by the fishers on all 
the vessels I travelled with, and could be observed in relation to exchange of information as 
well as catch. When a vessel has caught more than it can carry, it is common practice to give 
the surplus to another vessel. Catch is never given as part of any explicit exchange, but the 
fishermen clearly describe, and express, the recipient’s obligation to give catch back on a later 
occasion. Similarly, the fishermen explain that they provide information to others with an 
expectation of receiving information in return. 
Third is the general norm of considerateness on the fishing ground, which prescribes that 
one tries to ensure one’s own success without disrupting others’ attempts to do the same. One 
of the skippers and two of the mates actually used the term “considerateness” to describe this 
norm but unlike the two norms described above, the fishermen did not jointly outline the 
meaning of this as clearly as I have done here. My description of this norm is a general 
interpretation of a number of more specific rules and practices that can be observed in the 
fleet. Several fishermen described to me the general rule that a vessel entering a trawling 
ground is expected to avoid disrupting the fishing operations of the other vessels. This rule is 
also evident in practices of information exchange on crowded trawling grounds, as I will 
return to later. The interview material was supported by observations of gossip regarding 
boats with a habit of “pushing” others on the fishing grounds. A similar rule can be observed 
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in the purse seine fisheries, where the finder of a school has an informal right to make the first 
attempt to catch it. 
The data are clear that these norms are not specific to Seaborn Hills, but are general to 
the Norwegian purse seine/trawler fleet. Moreover, it is not reasonable to interpret these 
norms as specific to fisheries. They emerge as manifestations of general social norms in a 
specific professional setting. In sum, a good professional reputation is acquired by 
competitive success within a set of rules. The fishermen thus operate in a milieu hallmarked 
by intense competition for prestige, but where competitive success depends on compliance 
with a set of co-operative norms. 
The Technological Means of Learning 
Efficient harvesting requires long-term knowledge of fishing gear and technique, as well 
as short-term knowledge on the whereabouts of fish. The technology for acquiring this 
knowledge, by observation or learning from others, is essential to fishing capacity. There are 
three main types of technology for learning. First is gear for direct observations of fish. The 
vessels locate concentrations of fish by using sounders and sonars. Each vessel has high and 
low-frequency sounders that search vertically, and high and low-frequency sonars that search 
360o horizontally for concentrations of fish. The sonars can spot fish at distances varying 
between a few hundred meters and several kilometres, depending on the species and water 
conditions.  
Second is gear for finding fish by observing other vessels’ behaviour. GPS navigation 
systems and radars are integrated with digital map machines, which yields data on the exact 
position and movement pattern of all vessels within a normal radius of 12-16 nautical miles. 
In 2004, the so-called Automatic Identification System (AIS) became mandatory in this fleet. 
The AIS provides non-stop transfer of the boat’s identity and GPS data (location, course and 
speed) to all vessels within range of VHF radio – normally about 20 nm. The interface 
between the AIS and the map machine ensures that all these data are displayed directly on the 
electronic map of the receiving vessel. This information clearly indicates the operations and 
fishing patterns of the vessels displayed, suggesting the attractiveness of their current 
locations. The skippers and trawl bosses use this surveillance system continuously in their fish 
searching operations.  
Third is equipment for learning through direct communication with other fishermen. The 
AIS ensures high transparency on the fishing ground, and makes it easy to contact the right 
boat. The vessels are equipped with VHF (short range) and SSB (long range) radios that are 
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capable of searching a wide range of channels, making them poorly suited for exclusive 
information sharing. When fishing along the coast, the mobile phone is the most common 
medium for exchange of exclusive information. Satellite phone/fax or written messages over 
AIS enable vessels to share exclusive information when fishing offshore. 
The vessels have an Internet connection, giving the fishermen easy access to the auction 
data11 of other vessels, including what, how much and where they have fished, who made the 
purchase and at what price. These data will generally be too old and imprecise to be useful in 
the daily search for fish, but it represents an opportunity to check the accuracy of information 
exchanged previously through personal communication on the fishing ground, allowing a 
certain level of social control. 
The Social Dynamics of Technological Development 
The purse seiners / trawlers that participate in the blue whiting fisheries are generally 60-
70 m long, 8-13 m broad, and made of steel, with a loading capacity of 1,200 -1,800 tonnes. 
When fishing for blue whiting, they use a pelagic stern trawl that is towed over the fishing 
ground at a speed of around 4 knots. The cod end is capable of holding close to 600 tonnes at 
the most, but the fishermen try to stay well below this limit in order to avoid wrecking the 
gear. The trawl is equipped with sensors that indicate the amount of fish caught. The cod end 
floats to the surface due to a fall in pressure when the vessel heaves the trawl. The cod end is 
subsequently towed along the side where the catch is pumped directly into the tanks where it 
is cooled down by circulating water kept at the freezing point. 
Blue whiting represents a relatively new fishery, and knowledge changes rapidly 
compared with the more traditional fisheries, such as purse seining for herring or mackerel. 
Consequently, fishermen display a constant concern with the technical aspects of fishing in 
the blue whiting fisheries, and there is much more intense interest in this issue than in 
traditional fisheries. Using state-of-the-art fishing methods is essential to competitiveness, and 
this is a major incentive for new investments and improving one’s technical skills. The answer 
given by this skipper, when asked about the profitability of a recent investment made to 
improve the catching capacity of the trawl, illustrates this rationale: “It is not a question of 
cost, but of fishing more than your neighbour. And that is usually good business.” 
Skippers are frequently, and at times continuously, in touch with other vessels on the 
fishing ground, and the technicalities of fishing are a standard topic of discussion. A vessel 
                                                 
 
11 All Norwegian vessels are required to land fish through a fishermen’s sales organisation. The sales 
organisation for pelagic fish use an auction system, and members of the organisation have access to auction data. 
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will often share information with its close relations –  i.e. vessels from the same company, 
community or family – whenever it has significant news on technical improvements. For 
example, while fishing on the high seas, one of the leading Norwegian blue whiting fishing 
vessels discovered how to adjust the trawl doors so as to increase the catching capacity of the 
trawl. It subsequently called another Seaborn Hills vessel, considered its main co-operative 
partner and fiercest competitor, and informed it of this discovery. The skipper recalls that they 
transmitted this information over the VHF radio, implying that they had many potential 
listeners. Fishermen generally do not put great emphasis on keeping technical knowledge 
exclusive to particular groups. When strangers talk on the radio to avoid gear collision for 
example, it is common that they also compare gear, trawl size, speed and catch (see also 
Thorlindson 1994). 
It may seem paradoxical that technical knowledge is shared with great openness among 
fishermen in such a competitive setting. However, this openness becomes less of a puzzle 
when one considers the social recognition that is associated with having a technological edge. 
Knowledge cannot yield prestige unless it is displayed and it cannot be displayed without 
being shared. The competition for prestige thus generates a dynamic of technological 
development where leading vessels constantly search for technical advances, and share them 
with the community in exchange for social recognition once they are made. 
The exchange of knowledge in the Seaborn Hills fisheries milieu extends far beyond the 
inter-vessel communication at sea. The skippers and trawl bosses on different Seaborn Hills 
vessels are often neighbours, relatives and/or friends, and sharing experiences from fishing is 
a significant part of their personal relationships. Mutual fisheries-related knowledge exchange 
is thus an integral part of the reproduction of the Seaborn Hills fisheries community.  
I asked questions about these communication practices in all interview settings, and there 
is a joint perception among the fishermen and company administrations that there is a 
tradition for this exchange in Seaborn Hills. They perceive this co-operative spirit as a 
hallmark of their community. Sharing technical knowledge may thus not only be understood 
as a matter of pursuing prestige. It is also a way of displaying fellowship and tending to one’s 
position as a member of the community. This co-operative spirit may be interpreted as an 
implicit norm of collective action in terms of industry development, and several informants 
regard it as central cause of this milieu’s success in fishing. The following statement, by one 
of the net/trawl-bosses illustrates this: “Like in the trawl fisheries – we discuss improvements 
all the time... There’s something about discussions and receiving help from others. It would 
be terribly hard for one boat to develop it all.” 
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Technical knowledge develops and spreads quickly due to this synergy of competition 
and co-operation in the Seaborn Hills trawler fleet. The overall competitive climate makes the 
fleet receptive to innovation, and ensures that technological improvements are currently 
implemented in the fleet. The Norwegian blue whiting fishing fleet is thus technologically 
innovative, highly modernised and homogenous in terms of gear, technical solutions and 
working operations. The transferability of knowledge is enhanced by the homogeneity of the 
vessels themselves, which are by and large similarly constructed. 
The experiences of the fishermen also have a direct bearing on the development of 
fishing gear. A single company in southern Norway – Egersund Traal – develops and delivers 
the blue whiting trawl gear for the entire Norwegian blue whiting fleet. The company has 
contact with the fishing fleet on a daily basis, and feedback from fishermen plays a significant 
role in the gear development process. The fishermen also ask the company for news on 
technical improvements on a regular basis.12 
Knowledge on the Whereabouts of Fish 
Knowledge on the whereabouts of fish is a major factor in terms of fishing capacity. 
Current fish finding gear greatly restricts a single vessel’s capacity to find the best 
concentrations of fish within larger areas, and receiving reliable information from others is 
essential to fishing success. A network of colleagues who are willing to share information is 
thus one of the skipper’s most valuable assets. However, the short-term relevance of this 
knowledge makes it less exchangeable for prestige than technical innovation, and a significant 
incentive for information-sharing is thus lacking. It is generally an advantage to fish alone on 
a good fishing ground, and the general competition for catches provides an incentive for 
secrecy and deception. 
Information on the whereabouts of fish is generally managed more cautiously than 
technical knowledge, and is more often shared between closely related vessels through 
exclusive media, such as satellite phones. However, co-operative information sharing is 
significantly more wide-spread in this fleet than in the cases described in previous literature. 
Spending most of my time on the bridge, I observed an almost constant flow of information 
exchanged among vessels. During this period, I never observed fishermen give misleading 
advice on the whereabouts of fish. Similarly, the fishermen onboard always13 took 
                                                 
 
12 Pers. comm. Egersund Traal. 
13 The data contained one exception to this. This concerned a vessel rumoured to land catch illegally, which 
implied secrecy. This distrust thus related to factors external to the competition among vessels. 
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information received from other vessels on trust. The interviews on all vessels confirmed the 
high degree of compliance with the norm against lying. 
The absence of deceptive practices can largely be accounted for by the strictly-enforced 
moral norm against lying and the information technology described above, which represents a 
significant degree of social control. When a skipper asks a colleague for information on his 
fishing, he can be fairly confident that the will receive an honest, if not entirely complete, 
answer. However, the norm against downright lies cannot adequately account for the extent of 
information exchange in this fleet. While fishing, skippers continuously exchange information 
on observations of fish and how their fishery is going, and they often give significantly richer 
and more specific information than required by the norm against lying. For example, when 
one of the skippers made an unusually good finding of blue whiting in a period of generally 
poor fishing, he spoke to another Seaborn Hills vessel over the satellite phone and informed 
that “there is a damn fine stripe here”. The vessels exchanged truthful approximations of catch 
figures during their conversations with others, and in cases where vessels were out of radar 
range, they often supplemented this with exact coordinates for fishing grounds. 
Such observations were followed up by interviews on all vessels, and these data 
confirmed and completed the picture. Calling other vessels and asking for information is the 
most common way of learning from others, but vessels that co-operate on a regular basis 
sometimes call each other for the purpose of giving information. It is also usual to call vessels 
on fish searching expeditions and ask them to call back if they find attractive fishing spots, 
which quite often results in the requested response. Vessels exchange information on the 
whereabouts of fish much more frequently with boats they are closely related with, e.g. 
through kin, company or community ties, than they do with others. The “mate” is typically the 
vessel that has first priority when there is a surplus of catch or a valuable hint to be shared. 
There is generally a higher degree of openness among Seaborn Hills vessels than there is 
between vessels from Seaborn Hills and boats from other communities. Both observations and 
interviews confirm that this pattern becomes more prominent when fish is scarce. For 
example, in the mackerel fisheries, which are regulated by vessel quotas that are very easy for 
the vessels to catch, information exchange with strangers is more extensive than in the more 
competitive blue whiting fisheries. 
The norm of reciprocity provides incentives that largely explain information exchange 
beyond that required by the norm against lying. Skippers give reliable information to others 
based on expectations of reciprocation, and for the purpose of building their credibility among 
colleagues, thus strengthening their co-operative networks. Giving away information entails a 
  
20 
risk of losing the advantages associated with fishing alone on a good ground, but receiving 
hints about good fishing spots in return in the future is potentially more valuable. The 
rationale expressed by this trawl boss is typical: “We often discuss how much information to 
give, but it pays off to say things as they are. If you call a skipper and tell him that this is a 
good spot, and he goes there and finds fish and discovers that you helped him out, well, then 
he helps you next time.” 
The importance of trust may explain the fact that rich and detailed information is mostly 
exchanged among actors who are closely related. The norm of reciprocity has vaguer 
boundaries of conformity than the norm against lying, especially as the indebted fisher has an 
indefinite amount of time to fulfil his obligations. Communication based on expectations of 
reciprocation thus implies a high level of trust, and thus mainly involves actors who are 
closely related. One mate explained the logic in the following way: “When vessels we co-
operate with call us, they get what they require. As for boats we don’t know, it’s a matter of 
saying as little as possible without lying. You give info for the purpose of getting info in 
return.” 
A skipper acquires prestige by performing relatively well, while conforming with the 
basic co-operative norms. Prestige is most rewarding when achieved among one’s close 
relations, which is also where social control is most efficient and trust most prevalent. This 
explains why both co-operation and competition increases as the social relations become more 
intimate. The fact that a vessel’s toughest competitor is usually also its closest co-operative 
partner is not paradoxical once the normative basis for competition is kept in mind. In 
addition is the element of joint competition against vessels from other harbours and 
municipalities, which provides an incentive for co-operation among close relations. 
In the blue whiting fisheries, this normative system generates a pattern of information 
exchange where lies are avoided regardless of the vessel one communicates with, while 
information is shared beyond this point within more intimate networks of kin, company, 
community and friendship. The networks are not formalised and there are no norms against 
spreading information further to third parties. Skippers thus often receive second-hand 
information, and may share this information with other close relations. Information spreads 
within the fleet through these informal networks of co-operative relations. 
The combination of information exchange and surveillance technology ensures a fairly 
extensive flow of information on the whereabouts of fish within the entire blue whiting 
fishing fleet. When a skipper receives information on a good finding from a co-operating 
vessel, he will often move to that spot unless he is making a good catch himself, and may also 
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share this information with other close relations. A small group of vessels will consequently 
soon gather on a good fishing ground, and this concentration signals good fishing to other 
vessels within radar/AIS range. This results in non-exclusive transfer of information on 
attractive fishing spots to the entire fleet. Boats that have yet to find promising schools will 
move towards the observed cluster if they think it improves their chances of a good catch. The 
integration of radar and AIS with the digital map machines made it easy for me to observe and 
record such movement patterns. This dynamic could also be observed in the purse seine 
fisheries. These observations were made and followed up in interviews on three of the vessels, 
which confirmed the significance of observing the movements of others in order to locate 
good fishing spots. The interviews also showed that the skipper’s concern for his relative 
performance plays a certain role in this pattern of fleet movement. Some skippers avoid the 
risk of poor relative catch associated with moving too far away from their competitors, and 
inexperienced skippers especially will often pay attention to the moves of more experienced 
colleagues. A skipper’s decision to approach a specific concentration of vessels on the fishing 
ground usually has a much broader and – in terms of ensuring a good catch – more sensible 
foundation than in Barth’s (1966) analysis of fleet movement patterns in the Norwegian 
herring fisheries of the 1960s. Barth interprets cluster formation on the casting grounds as an 
inefficient result of the skipper’s fear of having his judgement questioned by the crew, 
arguing that a vessel’s chance of a good catch is greater if it fishes on its own. However, 
Barth’s argument is questionable in its own right. If fishing alone obviously is the superior 
strategy, not only the anthropologist but also the crew, whose incomes depend on absolute 
catch, would likely realise this, and question the judgement of skippers who only followed the 
crowd. The interviews and the observational data in this study clearly suggest that the 
tendency of vessels to form clusters on the fishing grounds stems from a rational pursuit of 
skippers and trawl bosses for the best possible catch in absolute and relative terms. For 
example, one informant skipper who was relatively inexperienced in this fishery paid close 
attention to the movements of a more experienced colleague, but also made independent 
decisions about whether to fish with others based on explicit, critical assessment of the actual 
chances of improving catches. 
Organising the Fishing Ground 
Although cluster formation on the fishing ground reflects transfer of knowledge on the 
whereabouts of fish and pursuit for good catches, it entails risks of inefficiency. Pelagic 
trawling is space-demanding, and concentrations of fishing vessels imply a certain danger of 
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gear colliding. The opening of a blue whiting trawl is 10-20,000 m2 and may be up to 200 m 
wide. It is kept open by trawl doors that are attached to the trawl by sweepers of some 250 m, 
adding more width. The doors are attached to the vessel by wires that are 800-1500 m long, 
implying fishing in depths of 300-500 m.14 In addition is the length of the trawl itself, which 
is about 600 m. This implies that a vessel should not fish closer than approximately one 
nautical mile to the vessel in front of it, but may keep a somewhat shorter distance sideways. 
Manoeuvring is very slow when trawling. Avoiding gear collisions thus requires an overview 
of the movements of nearby vessels, communication and a certain degree of order on the 
fishing ground. An ability to organise the vessels on the fishing ground is thus essential to the 
fleet’s fishing capacity, as this enables many vessels to exploit the best fishing spots 
simultaneously while avoiding gear collision and other inefficiency. 
It is common for a large number of boats to be concentrated on one ground, often with no 
more space between them than that required to avoid gear collisions. The general pattern in 
cases of high concentrations of fishing vessels is that the boats spontaneously organise fishing 
in line, sometimes circling in order to trawl the same spot several times. On one occasion, I 
counted 21 trawlers fishing in a circle of no more than 9 x 1 nautical miles. Fishing grounds 
are generally organised fairly smoothly. Giving way sometimes implies leaving a good spot, 
and incidents of annoyance, gossip, and – usually polite – verbal confrontations are common, 
but accidents and severe conflicts are rare. 
When a new vessel enters the fishing ground, the norm of considerate behaviour 
prescribes that it joins the end of the line or otherwise avoids pushing other vessels. It is 
generally not a great advantage to enter in front, as the sonar may not yield information on 
changes in the density of fish until it is too late to change course enough to stay on the shoal. 
The second vessel in the line will have time to do this provided it receives information from 
the boat ahead. I observed such information being requested, yielding a positive response 
from the vessel ahead, and addressed the issue in conversations with three of the fishermen in 
different settings. These fishermen confirmed that it is common to call the boat ahead and ask 
it to pass on information to facilitate manoeuvring for the maximum catch, and that the 
general practice is to comply with such requests, which implies that fishing with other vessels 
also offers some advantages. To sum up, the norm of considerateness on the fishing ground by 
and large prevents concentration of vessels from resulting in inefficiency, and ensures that the 
                                                 
 
14 For more detailed illustrations of this fishing gear, see Karlsen 1989. 
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potential advantage of information exchange is utilised. The fishermen report that these rules 
of conduct usually also function in relations between vessels from different nations. 
Capacity Utilisation 
Fishing success is associated with being smarter, better informed and more persistent 
than one’s competitors. Observations and interviews confirmed that skippers and vessel 
owners carefully keep track of their vessel’s catch relative to others, and sometimes make 
plans for how to stay in the lead or catch up with their main competitors. Skippers not only 
compete for personal prestige, but also for that of the company. Consequently, they often 
experience significant psychological pressure while fishing, as expressed by this skipper after 
he had called the company administrator to tell him they had caught 400 tonnes that day, 
making them the second-best vessel of the day: “If the other boats had caught 6-700 tonnes 
today, it would have been terrible to call”. The competitive climate generates a continuous 
pursuit to utilise one’s assets maximally. Skippers continuously use their co-operative 
networks, listen in on radio conversations, and record information of interest. Skippers and 
trawl-bosses often push their personal limits in terms of working hours while fishing. Their 
presence on the bridge – in front of the communication gear and the screens of the sounders, 
sonars and radars – is often only interrupted by hurried meals and a few hours of highly-
necessary sleep.  
The fishing effort in the blue whiting fisheries is related to the capacity utilisation in 
other fisheries in two ways. First, the fishermen informed me that the competitive spirit 
becomes manifest in quota-regulated fisheries as a race to be the quickest to catch one’s 
vessel quota. I also witnessed the competition to have the best catch of each day in all the 
fisheries that I attended, including herring and mackerel. There is thus a distinctly social 
component to capacity utilisation in quota-regulated fisheries. This competition releases 
excess capacity that can be used in fisheries that are not restricted by quotas, such as blue 
whiting. Second, having access to unregulated fish stocks provides a direct incentive to utilise 
fishing capacity maximally in the quota-regulated fisheries, as unregulated fisheries represent 
an opportunity to utilise capacity that exceeds the quotas. Norway’s blue whiting fisheries is a 
case of such an opportunity being utilised to its fullest extent. 
Towards a Socially-generated Tragedy of the Commons? 
I opened this article by arguing that the sociological and anthropological literature on 
fishing tends to regard normative and communicative factors as constraints on fishing effort, 
leaving the paradoxical impression that people are less capable of co-operating for the 
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purpose of efficient fishing than they are for resource conservation. The case of Norway’s 
blue whiting fisheries turns this paradox on its head. Social norms of excellence generate 
intense competition for prestige, which can only be successfully achieved in compliance with 
a set of co-operative norms. This pattern of norms and communication creates a synergic 
effect of co-operation and competition on fishing effort, in a fishery with limited restrictions 
in terms of regulation. There are no co-operative arrangements among fishermen to restrict 
this effort, although Seaborn Hills fishermen perceive their fleet as extremely efficient and 
recognise the need for regulation. Several fishers told me that they were worried about the 
effects of the current fishing effort on the blue whiting stocks, and expressed hope that the 
negotiating states would reach a quota agreement soon. The attitude expressed by this skipper 
is typical: “This fishing for blue whiting – it’s a free fishery, no quota – is not good for the 
resource. If we get a full boatload, that’s [approximately 1,500] tonnes. When many vessels 
do that, it amounts to a lot.” However, the blue whiting fisheries occupy many vessels from 
several states, and in the absence of state regulation to ensure collective action, no one will 
reduce his effort individually. The normative and communicative capabilities of fishermen 
have added to the increase of fishing effort that is predicted by the tragedy of the commons 
model in the Atlantic blue whiting fisheries. 
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